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Are institutions of higher education increasing tuition charges unnecessarily, 
unfairly, or, worse, because of  incompetence? Is there a bias toward higher 
costs and so higher charges by  institutions of higher education in the United 
States? Bowen (1980) suggests that costs expand to absorb whatever revenues 
become available to higher education. Tuition and fees at both public and pri- 
vate institutions increased at an average of  over 9 percent per annum from 
1980 to  1987, a rate about 4.5 percentage points faster than the consumer 
price index (CPI) rose over the same period (Hauptman 1990a, p. 4, table 1; 
see also Table 3.4 above). Even though the experience of the 1970s was quite 
different, with the average annual rate of increase of tuition lagging the CPI 
by about 1 percent, tuition increases exceeding advances in the CPI are noth- 
ing new.  For almost a century, from 1905 through 1989, tuition charges in- 
creased an annual rate of 2.5 percentage points in excess of the CPI for three 
private universities tracked by  Bowen (1969) and the College Savings Bank 
(1989). 
Critics conclude that higher education costs got out of control in the 1980s, 
that university presidents and their faculties are taking a larger share of  the 
national income while producing less, and that high cost is putting college 
education beyond the financial reach of many low - and, especially, middle- 
income households.’ The Washington Post Weekly (21-27  August 1989, p. 
A18) has gone as far as to characterize higher education as a machine with no 
brakes. Defendants of higher education call attention to declines in federal 
support, to the overhang of the long-deferred maintenance of buildings and 
the more rapid obsolescence of  increasingly sophisticated equipment, and to 
the desirability of  increasing faculty salaries so as to attract the most able 
1. For example, William Bennett, “Our Greedy Colleges,” New York Times, 18 February 1987, 
p. A31. 
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people to the professoriate (e.g., Hauptman 1990a). Others mention the in- 
creased expenditures on marketing, student services, and support operations 
that have become necessary to attract students in this more status-conscious 
and comfort-demanding  era, when the number of people in the prime college- 
attending population age groups is declining. 
Tuition is the price charged to students for higher education. Total expend- 
itures by colleges and universities are much higher than tuition revenues, even 
at institutions with the highest tuitions. Colleges and universities depend on 
other sources of revenue as well, including state and  federal governments, 
endowment earnings, philanthropy, and the sale of ancillary services. For all 
institutions of higher education, tuition and fees combined are less than one- 
quarter of  total revenues. In 1985-86,  tuition and fees covered only 36 per- 
cent of  direct educational expenditures (what we subsequently call adjusted 
educational and general (AE&G) expenditure, less scholarships from unre- 
stricted university funds) at all colleges and universities in America (Ander- 
son, Carter, and Malizio 1989). From a social perspective, the problem of 
high cost is larger than the problem of high tuition. nition increases alone, 
however, do not imply rampant cost inflation because increases may be caused 
by shifts in the relative proportion of different revenue sources. 
This part of the volume examines the changing patterns of costs at colleges 
and universities in light of  these claims. We  do not purport to measure out- 
puts, so our discussion of productivity is tangential. In this chapter, we de- 
scribe six theories of why college costs surged in the 1980s, and we describe 
the data we will use in the following chapters to explore these theories. Chap- 
ter 12 examines changes in aggregate expenditures, expenditures  per student, 
and expenditures per degree at different types of  colleges and universities. 
Chapter 13 reveals how enrollment growth affects costs and assesses scale 
economy estimates in higher education. Finally, Chapter 14 decomposes the 
cost increases of  the last decade into changes in  the studentlfaculty ratio, 
changes in faculty compensation, changes in nonfaculty instructional costs, 
and changes in the cost of higher education’s support functions. 
11.1  Why Do College Costs Rise? 
The real cost of educational expenditures per student at U.S. colleges and 
universities rose about 2.7 percent annually from 1978-79  and 1987-88,* less 
than the rate at which real tuition rose, but high enough for concern neverthe- 
less. The increased costs in  higher education might be explained in several 
ways. Six broad points of  view reveal the diversity of opinion about rising 
costs in higher education. 
One explanation holds that the market is competitive and that institutions 
2. The 2.7 percent per year growth in expenditures per  student is calculated from an  increase of 
$1,752 on a 1978-79  base of $6,370 per student (all figures expressed in  1987-88  constant dol- 
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must therefore meet market tests to survive and prosper. Under these con- 
straints, colleges must provide the range of services that students wish to pur- 
chase. Naturally, the level of costs follows from the level of services. F’rospec- 
tive students may be attracted by  faculties with stronger reputations, better 
facilities, a stronger marketing program, and services that improve students’ 
chances of  success or that enhance their experience. Where the market for 
prospective students is strongly competitive, cost increases might reflect prod- 
uct improvements that differentiate a single institution in ways that prospec- 
tive students find worth the cost, which is passed along accordingly as higher 
tuition. Colleges, then, must spend more on computers, wider cumcula, in- 
ternational programs, and attractive grounds and charge accordingly or risk 
losing students to  institutions who do respond to these student demands. 
Thus, rising costs of higher education may reflect a change in preferences of 
students toward a more expensive educational experience with enhanced ser- 
vices.  A critical issue is whether institutions of  higher education sell their 
services in workably competitive markets. 
A special case of increased costs due to changing student tastes arises from 
shifts among degree programs. Student interests shifted noticeably in  the 
1980s. Bowen and Sosa (1989,47) report that, “between 1970-71  and 1984- 
85, the number of  degrees conferred in the arts and  sciences dropped from 
40.0 percent of all degrees to 24.9 percent,” as students and their parents be- 
came concerned about job prospects and the relevance of the arts and sciences. 
The number of students earning degrees in education also fell substantially. 
Over the same period, a striking increase occurred in the number of engineer- 
ing and business degrees a~arded.~ 
3. The mix of degrees awarded by American colleges and universities changed substantially in 
the 1980s. The percentage of total degrees awarded by  the institutions  in our sample in each of  10 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on HEGWIPEDS data, (see n. 14 below). 
Note: All degrees are four-year except the categories, two-year, professional (which are postbac- 
calaureate), and other (which includes graduate). 
As  can be seen from this table, the percentage of  degrees awarded in the arts and sciences (the 
categories  natural science, social science, and humanities combined) fell from 24.0 in 1978-79  to 
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If engineering and business degrees are more costly than arts and sciences 
and education degrees, the shift in  student interests alone can account for 
some of the rise in the average cost of  higher education. In order to evaluate 
the importance of this explanation of college and university cost inflation in 
the 1980s, one might identify the relative costs of enrollment in different dis- 
ciplinary programs and simulate the aggregate cost increase resulting from the 
actual change in degree mix that occurred over the period, holding constant 
the costs in each discipline. In view of the shift away from arts and sciences 
and education toward engineering and business programs, this explanation 
probably would account for some of  the rising aggregate costs. In essence, 
costs increase because students select more expensive educational programs  .4 
Changes in costs due to enrollment shifts would occur in a competitive envi- 
ronment. 
A second point of view also considers the market for higher education to be 
competitive but recognizes that increased prices of inputs faced by all colleges 
and universities will pass through to consumers in higher charges even if  the 
students see no improvement in the product. For example, a shortage of qual- 
ified faculty might increase instructional salaries industry wide. The increased 
cost of  library materials, utilities, and  building maintenance would be re- 
flected in  total costs and  so in  tuition charges and claims on legislatures. 
Again, a critical issue is the degree of competition because it affects the extent 
to which factor price increases are passed to consumers. 
To  explore the issue of competition further, consider whether institutions in 
higher education operate in workably competitive markets. Although institu- 
tions differ in character, mix of  programs, size, and location, many  institu- 
tions may operate in market segments that force them to compete for students. 
For institutions with strong national or regional reputations, the competition 
may be among institutions at some distance from one another but with a cor- 
respondingly large number of competitors. For other institutions, particularly 
those whose students commute daily from home, the relevant market may be 
very local, and a given institution may hold a near monopoly on certain ser- 
vices.  Yet  the next relevant alternative for students may  be more hours of 
employment; hence, these schools may have little ability to increase their tui- 
tion without significant loss in enrollment. An important consideration, then, 
4. Sufficient data on relative cost differences among disciplines and enrollments (not degrees) 
by discipline are not available to conduct such a simulation. Furthermore, the effect of  changing 
degree mix alone on the cost inflation of higher education might be.  overstated by  such a stimula- 
tion  analysis. First, short-run effects of  changes in student preferences among disciplines are 
likely to have relatively little effect, as they will be absorbed  as changes in the studenvfaculty  ratio 
across disciplines. Second, to the extent possible, there will be some substitution of  resources 
(e.g., space, supplies, support staff) from disciplines losing enrollments to those gaining them. 
Third, the distribution of enrollments across departments is likely to be less responsive to chang- 
ing preferences than the distribution of  degrees since a significant proportion of enrollments in 
many disciplines consists of “service courses” that form part of  general education requirements. 
Thus, while the changing degree mix probably accounts for some of  the cost inflation of  the 
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is the size of the relevant market for each school and the nature of  the pro- 
grams offered. A critical issue for understanding increased costs is the nature 
of competition in higher education. 
As a third explanation for the rising costs of higher education, the compet- 
itive view might be modified if  colleges and universities have little opportu- 
nity to substitute other inputs for labor in the face of the rising relative cost of 
their labor inputs. This idea was articulated initially by  Baumol and Bowen 
(1966; Baumol 1967), who applied it first to the live performing arts and then 
to other service industries. If a certain amount of labor is required to produce 
higher education, that is to say, if  studentlfaculty ratios are fixed, then, as 
faculty salaries rise, costs must rise. Productivity gains in the rest of  the econ- 
omy will tend to allow average wage levels to increase with the general price 
level plus the rate of increase in average productivity. Faculty salaries must 
increase at the same rate as other wages in the economy if an academic career 
is to remain attractive. Yet higher education may have smaller gains in produc- 
tivity if student/faculty ratios are difficult to change. That would be the case if 
the personal interaction between students and faculty is the product itself, akin 
to hearing the Boston Symphony perform in Symphony Hall. Therefore, costs 
and charges in higher education will tend to increase at the same rate as other 
salaries in the economy and faster than the general price level. At the heart of 
this argument is the issue of  whether there is any prospect of  changing the 
studentlfaculty ratio and sufficient scope for institutions to adopt innovative 
methods that increase productivity.’ 
A fourth possible explanation focuses on the central position of faculty and 
administrators within a college or university. Under the constraints of a not- 
for-profit organization, it seems plausible to assume that the compensation6  of 
those in control, as well as the prestige of being associated with the institu- 
tion, may play a prominent role among the institution’s objectives (Newhouse 
1970, 65). The trustees and administration, as well as the faculty, may give 
considerable weight to the quality of their product as a means to pursue status. 
Under such circumstances, and with limitations on free entry into the market, 
institutions are likely to provide greater quality (smaller classes, higher ad- 
mission standards, greater emphasis on research) than would accommodate 
consumer tastes in  a competitive for-profit market (Newhouse 1970). Al- 
5.  On the basis of a sample of 37 institutions, Getz and Siegfried (1990) identify and document 
30 significant innovations in higher education over the past 50 years. The innovations range from 
curriculum to finances to student life.  It appears that innovations diffuse less rapidly in higher 
education than in manufacturing.  Innovations that use electronic devices seem to diffuse faster 
than others; innovations involving faculty decision making or that require significant capital out- 
lays seem to diffuse more slowly. The evidence suggests that opportunities exist for institutions of 
higher education to innovate. Productivity need not remain stagnant. For a positive program to 
enhance productivity in Research and Doctorate-Granting universities, see Massy (1989). 
6. Faculty compensation is not restricted to pecuniary rewards. Job characteristics such as sta- 
tus,  control,  and hours of  work are important to all workers; noncompetitive rents may be ex- 
tracted through increased status, control over the amount of time faculty spend doing research 
instead of teaching, the number and distribution of hours worked, and other nonpecuniary means. 266  Malcolm Getz and John J. Siegfried 
though one might argue that management’s responsibility is to limit faculty 
tendencies in this direction, administrators in higher education are frequently 
drawn from faculty ranks, and many dream that they will eventually return to 
the classroom. In view of their experience as faculty and their possible return 
to the ranks, they may act, not as the representatives of  trustees or public 
officials, but rather as agents for the faculty, adopting policies that enhance 
their salaries, comfort, and status. For institutions where competition is in- 
tense, the outcome may be the same as with a competitive process. However, 
for institutions having succeeded in establishing reputations with distinctive 
programs and other advantages over rivals, the advantage may be captured by 
the faculty in the form of increased compensation, improved working condi- 
tions, and featherbedding or strategies that promote and display the status of 
the faculty (e.g., lower teaching loads or a greater emphasis on research). In 
order for this explanation to bear on the increasing costs of higher education 
in the 1980s. however, faculty and administrators must either have become 
more effective in manipulating institutions to their personal advantage or have 
experienced a change in their preferences, for example, taking greater pride 
in working at a prestigious institution than they did a decade earlier.’ 
A fifth view of the rising costs of higher education considers the quality of 
management and decision making in colleges and universities. If  institutions 
do not carefully assess costs and benefits when making decisions, if purchase 
decisions are not made in a way that induces vendors to give attractive prices, 
and if rewards are little associated with performance, then indeed costs will 
be higher without the college’s services being more attractive to students or 
improving faculty welfare. In  short, the institution may  fail to achieve its 
goals, whatever they are, at minimum cost. The weak management view is 
consistent with presidents and other administrators rising through the ranks as 
successful academics but with limited experience and skill at management. 
Alternatively, managers imported from outside higher education may fail for 
lack of  experience in higher education. Of course, when an institution is in a 
competitive market, it will lose students and faculty if  management is suffi- 
ciently poor. To account for rising college and university costs in the 1980% 
however, the quality of  management must have deteriorated vis-5-vis earlier 
periods. Critical questions here are the extent to which market forces disci- 
pline institutions to perform efficiently and whether institutions have become 
less adept at attracting and sustaining skilled managers. 
A sixth view points to a series of government regulations that create new 
expectations for higher education. Occupational Safety and Health Adminis- 
tration regulations, Affirmative Action programs, requirement for access and 
services for the handicapped, requirements for coequal facilities for intercol- 
7. On the success of faculty extracting rents from universities, especially at  larger, research- 
oriented institutions, see Hoenack (1983). For an argument that status is an important component 
in modem consumers’ utility functions, see Frank (1985). For arguments that the weight placed 
on status  and “winning”  has increased over recent decades, see Frank and Cook (1990). 267  Cost Inflation 
legiate athletics for females, and increased requirements for cost sharing in 
many research, training, and other program grants might be cited as examples 
of regulations that impose cost burdens on institutions, usually without com- 
mensurate revenue offsets. Of special note in this view are changing federal 
government policies with  respect to  indirect cost recovery rates.  Federal 
grants bear direct costs of the time, equipment, and supplies used by investi- 
gators and their research time. However, the direct costs do not include rent 
for the space, access to library and computing resources, the accounting and 
oversight functions of  the university, and many other functions necessary to 
operating a research enterprise. Universities have been allowed to aggregate 
all such costs and to charge an appropriate fraction of such costs as an add-on 
to grants called “indirect cost recovery.” In recent years, however, the federal 
agencies responsible for reviewing indirect cost recovery rates have sought to 
lower them even when the cost basis is well established by detailed accounting 
information. If the allowed indirect cost recovery declines relative to the costs 
incurred, other sources of revenue, including tuition and appropriations from 
state legislatures must cover more of the shared costs. Changes in federal 
programs and in regulations, then, can affect the level and mix of  costs on 
campuses, especially where federal grants are a significant source of revenue. 
It is worth noting, however, that many of  the regulations that affect higher 
education affect other sectors of our society as well. 
In the six explanations of  rising costs just given, the rising costs benefit 
different groups. In the competitive product story, the advantages of  higher 
cost accrue to the students who are simply shopping with their dollars from a 
long menu for the bundle of  services they wish. In the input price story, in- 
creasing costs reflect events in input markets beyond the control of  higher 
education. No one in  higher education benefits, not even the faculty whose 
compensation rises (because their opportunity costs rise as well). In Baumol 
and Bowen’s view, higher education is disadvantaged relative to the rest of the 
economy by its inherently labor-intensive technology of instructors teaching 
students in  groups of  relatively fixed size. By contrast, in the management 
utility maximization view, the faculty and administrators pocket the higher 
costs as salary and prestige, using market power to impose higher charges on 
students so they can earn more than they would make in their best alternative 
employment and enjoy a preferred work environment.8  In the poor manage- 
ment  story,  presidents and  administrators, students,  and  faculty  all  lose 
through poor decision making. In the government-as-culprit view, congres- 
sional and social goals take precedence. These views are not necessarily mu- 
tually exclusive, and there may  be other explanations as compelling on a 
priori grounds as some of these (Hauptman 1990a; Kirshstein et al. 1990). 
In this study, we present empirical evidence that, in some cases, lends sup- 
port to some of these explanations and, in other cases, seems inconsistent with 
8. Sykes (1988) argues this view forcefully, to the point of exaggeration. 268  Malcolm Getz and  John  J. Siegfried 
some of them. The study may generate new points of view as well. We  hope 
the result will be a better understanding of the nature of changes in the cost of 
higher education and, by  inference, improved insight into the nature of  the 
institutions. Before we delve into our data, however, we need to address the 
issue of service quality in higher education, after which we describe the data 
used in this part of the volume. 
11.2  Product Quality and Diversity 
Do higher-cost colleges and universities produce better education? If  an 
automobile plant produces superior cars, we may expect those cars to be more 
costly and to bear higher sticker prices. If consumers buy the more expensive 
cars when less expensive ones are available, we may conclude that consumers 
value the additional quality in excess of  the cost of  the additional resources 
required to create it and that the automobile plant is more “productive” even 
though it incurs higher costs per unit. Can the case be made that the quality of 
output from higher education has increased sufficiently to make the higher- 
priced product worth the extra cost? Has higher education become more valu- 
able as its costs have  risen? Or have costs increased even as the quality of 
college education has stagnated or, worse, declined? 
Quality in higher education is nearly impossible to define (Solmon 1973). 
One might take the earnings differential between college and high  school 
graduates as an index of the contribution of college ed~cation,~  but growth in 
the differential can be ascribed to numerous factors other than improved qual- 
ity in higher education, for example, shifts in the demand for the labor of high 
school and college graduates or a decline in the quality of secondary educa- 
tion. 
It is tempting to conclude that improved knowledge of  the various disci- 
plines implies an ever-increasing quality of college education, but such a con- 
clusion may be far from correct. First, it can be argued that the steady flow of 
new scholarly research does not always improve faculty knowledge. There is 
a limit to what the human mind can store, process, and understand. Faculty 
knowledge progresses only if better ideas and improved understanding replace 
inferior ideas and understanding. Thus, progress depends on the character of 
competition  for ideas and the process by which science and art advance. There 
is no assurance against temporary setbacks, no guarantee that each discipline 
moves closer to “truth” each decade. 
A more fundamental flaw in the argument that scholarly progress guaran- 
tees improved quality in higher education is the implicit premise that the pur- 
pose of  higher education is to impart “truth” to students. Many would chal- 
lenge that premise, arguing instead that the primary purpose of a liberal arts 
9. For  a survey of  empirical  studies of  the  value of  a college education based  on earnings 
differentials, see Cohn and Geske (1990, 106-10). See also Table 3.2 above. 269  Cost Inflation 
education is-at  the least-to  help individuals develop their capacity to think 
clearly and critically about issues and problems in a variety of ways. If that is 
the purpose of higher education, scholarly progress among the disciplines in 
discerning “truth” may  have little, if  any,  effect on the primary output of 
higher education. 
Higher education benefits students through a sequence of events. First, stu- 
dents and their families spend money on tuition, but, more important, they 
invest their time, time that alternatively thev pwld have devoted to earning 
income. The forgone earnings of most studen,.  s still larger than tuition at all 
but the most expensive private institutions.  lo  Second, the institution provides 
a set of experiences that transform the students. Among the experiences will 
be contact with faculty in classes of varying size, association with other stu- 
dents of differing interests, backgrounds, talents, and aspirations, a range of 
social experiences, and, perhaps, religious, athletic, cultural, political, and 
other influential experiences. Third, these education experiences have influ- 
ence throughout the rest of the student’s life. The influences may be  on career 
choice, on earnings, on the likelihood of changing careers, on choice of mate, 
on participation in politics, on health, on enjoyment of the arts, and so on. An 
assessment of  the performance of  an institution of  higher education would 
establish the connections between the three links of the chain: student com- 
mitment, institutional experiences, and life prospects. Although a few studies 
have followed a cohort of students through the process and some analysts have 
drawn inferences from cross-sectional comparisons, all the studies fall short 
of  offering a comprehensive view of  the influence of  various experiences 
in higher education on the life prospects of  participants (Jacobi, Astin, and 
Ayala 1987). 
Productivity studies of higher education are particularly difficult to con- 
duct. Traditional productivity studies of manufactured products relate output 
to inputs. Productivity is then judged on the basis of trends over time or on 
comparisons of the amount of output produced per input unit across producers 
at a point in time. In most cases output can be measured directly in physical 
units. 
For higher education, on the other hand, there is substantial disagreement 
about both what output is and what it should be (Pascarelli and Terenzini 
1991). One source of the dispute is the practice of funding America’s higher 
education with contributions from various sources. As a result, students, their 
parents, foundation officials, alumni, government agencies, and taxpayers all 
believe that they have a role in defining the goals of higher education. Add to 
10. Following Table 3.5 above, average nine-month earnings (after taxes and discounted by the 
probability of unemployment) for a 25- to 34-year-old high school graduate with no college ex- 
perience in  1987-88  were $12,925 for males and $9,128 for females. Average tuition at private 
universities was $8,770 in 1987-88.  However, some institutions charged much more: tuition and 
fees  at  Bennington  College,  Rensselaer  Polytechnic  Institute,  and  ’Mane  University  were 
$14,850, $1 1,850, and $1 1,280, respectively, in 1987-88  (College Entrance Examination Board, 
The College Handbook  1987-88  [New York,  19871). 270  Malcolm Getz and John J. Siegfried 
this faculty and administrators, who argue that their professional judgments 
are essential to directing the mission of  such a complex enterprise as higher 
education, and considerable conflict occurs about output mix and priorities. 
Colleges and universities in  America produce a vast  array of  goods and 
services. For undergraduates, colleges contribute to cognitive and  affective 
development, sorting and screening, helping individuals develop a sense of 
responsibility and self-esteem, social development, citizenship, and even en- 
tertainment (e.g., on Saturday afternoon in the university football stadium). 
A large fraction of our universities are also heavily involved in graduate and 
postbaccalaureate  professional education and research, the products of which 
include future lawyers, physicians, business leaders, and faculty-and  new 
ideas. Many of our colleges and universities also provide public services, such 
as the agricultural extension and experimentation services of  land-grant uni- 
versities or the job retraining assistance provided by many two-year colleges. 
The problems of measuring the productivity of colleges and universities, 
however, go beyond multiple outputs valued differently by different constitu- 
ents.” By its very nature, the output of higher education includes substantial 
intangible elements that are not traded in markets. Few would argue that the 
sole purpose of higher education is to enhance the subsequent earnings of 
students. But how is one to measure the benefits of self-discovery, socializa- 
tion, maturation, and improved reasoning and judgment beyond their effects 
on labor market achievement? How is one to measure the value of friendships 
and memories? In short, so many of the services of higher education cannot 
be  measured in physical units and escape formal valuation in markets that 
there is little prospect ever to pin down even a rough approximation of their 
value. 
The problems go even further than multiple, intangible, and unpriced out- 
puts. Productivity analysis in higher education faces additional measurement 
problems because many of  the outputs are jointly produced with inputs that 
are not hired by the institutions, for example, students’ intrinsic talents, and 
because the production process for learning is so poorly understood and varies 
so much across individuals. Furthermore, output includes both consumption 
and investment components, and many people consider the process itself to 
be an  essential component of output. 
A great deal of  what individuals gain from a college experience may,  in 
fact, be impossible to measure. Many years ago, James A. Garfield spoke of 
the ideal college as a log with Mark Hopkins on one end and a student on the 
other.I2 We  may suppose that Hopkins imparted a set of  skills that might be 
11. Multiple outputs can  be related to multiple inputs with sophisticated econometric tech- 
niques. For illustrations of this practice applied to higher education, see Cohn, Rhine, and Santos 
(1989) and de Groot, McMahan, and Volkwein (1989). 
12. Garfield articulated this view of college during a speech at his aha  mater, Williams Col- 
lege, before he was inaugurated as the twentieth president of  the United States. At the time of the 
speech, Hopkins was president of Williams College. 271  Cost Inflation 
measured directly. But we may also suppose that Hopkins responded to stu- 
dent puzzles, instilled a spirit of responsibility, nurtured intellectual curiosity, 
and offered a measure of inspiration that could not be measured directly. We 
expect the professor to appeal differently to different students; some need con- 
text, some need discipline, some need courage. We expect students to respond 
differently: some value the poetry, some the logic, and some the power of the 
same idea. We can imagine a student of accounting learning in one setting that 
the debits are on the window side of  the ledger, in another why firms may 
(honestly) keep three sets of books (one for the shareholders, one for the tax 
collector, and one for the managers), and in a third why accountants seldom 
become chief executive officers of large corporations. Higher education may 
be as important in socialization, matching interest to opportunity, and devel- 
oping a coherent worldview as in developing specific skills. Social science 
needs more powerful tools if it is to offer insight into the full breadth of influ- 
ence of higher education on those who invest in it. 
Finally, higher education may affect our society on a scale far beyond the 
consequences measured for each individual student. Colleges and universities 
produce ideas expressed in books, music, art, patents, and medical, manage- 
rial, and legal techniques. Professors advise senators and presidents, often 
creating and interpreting the vocabulary by  which the public debates the is- 
sues of the day. The full consequences of having a literate and cultured society 
may not be measured even approximately by  the experiences of individuals 
taken one at a time. Measuring such purely social consequences of  higher 
education is beyond available techniques. 
Realistic estimates of educational production functions have been limited 
by  the obstacles outlined above (Schapiro 1987; Gilmore 1988). Because the 
task of measuring outcomes is so difficult (some argue impossible), our focus 
here is on inputs and costs rather than results. Any insight about outcomes and 
productivity offered here comes indirectly and cautiously. Even if  we are un- 
able to measure and value outcomes, however, if  they have remained about 
the same over the past decade, we can still learn something from changes in 
costs over the period.13 
11.3  Higher Education in the 1980s 
It is useful to begin our analysis of costs with a review of the institutions 
constituting higher education in the United States in the  1980s. Institutions 
13. The difficulties measuring outputs and assigning inputs to these outputs may make produc- 
tivity analysis in higher education difficult, but they do not make it impossible. In a study con- 
ceived out of the project that led to this book,  Getz and Siegfried (1990) look at productivity in 
higher education in terms of the rate at which ultimately successful innovations diffuse through 
educational institutions. By  restricting the analysis to “successful” innovations, the speed with 
which colleges and universities adopt new ideas can be used to measure their “productivity” be- 
cause the failure to adopt improvements  promptly forces society to incur unnecessary opportunity 
costs. Characteristics of institutions that appear to be leaders in innovation can then be identified. 272  Malcolm Getz and John J. Siegfried 
Table 11.1  Sample Institutions Compared with Population 
(1) No. of Institutions  (2) No. of  Institutions 
per Camegie  in Our Sample,  (3) Coverage [(2)/(  l)] 
































Sources: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1987, table 2); and U.S.  De- 
partment of Education HEGWIPEDS data for 1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86,  and 1987-88. 
“Called  “Liberal Arts 11”  by the Carnegie Foundation. 
are a proper focus of  the analysis of costs because in most cases the critical 
decisions are made by officials of  individual institutions. Moreover, the De- 
partment of Education collects data about institutions, and so analysis of in- 
stitutional behavior with a broad sample is possible. The few studies of costs 
at the department level have almost always looked at a single institution or a 
small group of  institutions (Hoenack et al.  1986; Tiemey 1980a; Brovender 
1974; Razin and Campbell 1972; Borgman and Bartram 1969; Gibson 1968; 
Buckles 1978), thus limiting the extent to which their findings can be gener- 
alized. 
There are about 3,400 institutions of higher education in the United States 
offering at least a two-year associate or four-year degree program, as shown 
in Table 1 1.1. At least two hundred of these were founded during the 1980s, 
more than the total number of colleges existing in  America in 1850 (Harris 
1972, table 5.2-1,  p. 924). The institutions serve diverse missions; well over 
one-third of them offer only two-year programs, and about one-fifth offer four- 
year programs exclusively. Approximately one-third of  the institutions offer 
postbaccalaureate programs in addition to undergraduate programs, and about 
one-fifth have programs confined to specialties such as freestanding medical 
or law schools. Over 400 institutions award doctoral degrees. Other institu- 
tions engage in postsecondary training programs that are not generally viewed 
as part of  higher education; most important among these are the proprietary 
vocational schools. These usually offer vocational training (e.g., data pro- 
cessing, cosmetology, truck driving). 
Our analysis relies on the HEGIS/IPEDSL4  survey of  institutions of  higher 
education undertaken annually by the U.S. Department of Education. We  use 
14. The annual “census” of  colleges and universities was called the Higher Education General 
Information  Survey (HEGIS) through  1985-86.  At that time, the survey was revised and ex- 
panded and its name changed to the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 273  Cost Inflation 
survey data from 1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86,  and  1987-88  to examine the 
finances and enrollments of  2,045 institutions over time.15 Our sample in- 
cludes over 80 percent of the institutions identified by the Carnegie Founda- 
tion  in  all  categories except the  Two-Year  group, where our coverage is 
slightly over 60  percent, and specialized institutions, which we exclude en- 
tirely (see Table 1 1.  1)16 Eight-six percent of the colleges and universities that 
award a bachelor’s degree are included in our data base. In the remainder of 
this part of the volume, we draw conclusions from the sample of 2,045 as 
though it were all of higher education.  For expositional convenience, we 
will occasionally refer to the period 1978-79  to 1987-88  as though it were 
coterminous with the decade of the 1980s. 
The HEGWIPEDS responses are unaudited. When an institution’s own ac- 
counting system uses categories that are incongruent with the HEGWIPEDS 
categories, the institution may make arbitrary choices in  deciding on  a re- 
sponse. The institution may make one choice in one year and respond differ- 
ently in a subsequent year. The Department of Education, which collects the 
survey, does not verify the information, test for consistency from one year to 
the next, or require that the information be complete. We  have excluded from 
our statistics institutions with wildly implausible figures by checking for cer- 
tain kinds of internal consistency. We do not provide independent verification 
of the data. Caveat lector. 
The flagship state universities, leading private universities, and other doc- 
15.  Our sample consists of  2,045 colleges and universities that operated continuously in the 
United States from 1978-79  to 1987-88.  We  omitted specialized institutions (e.g.. freestanding 
medical and law schools) and any other schools that did not have any full-time undergraduate 
students. Only institutions reporting at least some expenditures for instruction, student services 
(e.g.,  admissions, registrar), institutional support (president, provost), and  plant  operations 
(maintenance, utilities) are included. In short, a college is a college in our view only if it reports 
spending at least one dollar on each of these four fundamental services; a few dozen institutions 
were eliminated on the basis of this criterion. Reports of zero expenditures  for sponsored  research, 
public service, and unrestricted scholarships appear for some institutions that surely have such 
expenditures. We  concluded that those institutions reported such expenditures in other accounts. 
If  the reporting appears consistent (e.g., a category was zero for all four years), we accepted it, 
understanding that some of the expenditures in other categories are for research, public service, 
and/or scholarship purposes. If the reporting standard appears inconsistent (e.g.. Columbia Uni- 
versity’s public service expenditures increased from zero in 1984 to $126,000,000 in 1988), we 
assumed that there had been a change in accounting practice that would invalidate comparisons 
over time, and the institution was deleted from our sample. We also eliminated five colleges that 
reported implausible enrollment fluctuations, probably caused by  data-processing errors. Re- 
ported library expenditure data for many institutions on the IPEDS  1987-88  data tape are implau- 
sible (e.g., we do not believe that Harvard spent nothing on its 50 libraries in  1988). Because 
library expenditures are included in academic support, we do not report library expenditures sepa- 
rately. 
16. For a description of each Camegie classification, see Table 2 of  the introduction to this 
volume. 
17.  Based on enrollment shares reported in Table 2 of  the introduction to this volume and 
coverage ratios reported in Table 11.1. we estimate that our sample includes 68.5 percent of total 
enrollments and 87.2 percent of enrollments at four-year undergraduate colleges in 1987-88.  The 
largest share of total enrollments missing from the sample is two-year colleges (22.9 percent). We 
exclude specialized institutions, which account for only 3.8 percent of total enrollments. Thus, 
only 4.8 percent of the enrollments missing from our survey come from four-year institutions. 274  Malcolm Getz and John J. Siegfried 
lsble 11.2  Sample Institutions and Enrollment by Carnegie Classification 
Carnegie  No.  of  % of  No.  of  % of 
Classification  Institutions  Instititutions  FTE Students‘  FTE Students 
Research  90  4.4  1,660,920  23.2 
Doctoral  96  4.7  895.05 1  12.5 
Comprehensive  522  25.5  2,174,478  30.4 
Liberal Arts I  131  6.4  185,754  2.6 
Other-Four-Year  353  17.3  265,190  3.7 
Two-Year  853  41.7  1,975,80  1  27.6 
Total  2,045  100.0  7,157,194  100.0 
Source: Calculations by authors based on HEGWIPEDS data. 
‘Full-time-equivalent (FTE) students = full-time students + ‘h part-time students averaged over 
1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86,  and 1987-88. 
toral institutions that the Carnegie Foundation labels “Research” and “Doc- 
toral” constitute fewer than 10 percent of the institutions of higher education 
but account for 36 percent of the total enrollment in full-time equivalents, as 
shown in Table  11.2.‘* They dominate graduate education, public service, 
research, big-time college athletics,and name recognition by the general pub- 
lic; these are the conglomerates of higher education. Conversely, the smaller 
institutions in the Liberal Arts I and Other-Four-Year categories account for 
24 percent of institutions in our sample, but only 6 percent of enrollment. 
The Research and Doctoral institutions have a special importance because 
their graduate programs produce future professors for all of higher education 
and their research efforts are an integral part of basic research in America. The 
Liberal Arts I schools graduate a disproportionate share of the baccalaureates 
who later become  professor^^^ and a large fraction of our country’s cultural, 
political, and business leaders. There is something of a pecking order of influ- 
ence and prestige, with Research universities training faculty for most of the 
other sectors. Yet  the Comprehensive institutions and the ?kro-Year colleges 
together enroll more than half of all students. All the institutions play different 
roles and therefore have different characteristics, which are reflected as much 
in their finances as in their catalogs. 
The great importance of the private sector in higher education in the United 
States is unique in the world. Private colleges and universities account for 41 
percent of the institutions of higher education, as shown in Table  11.3. The 
private institutions (“privates,” for short) in every Carnegie classification are 
smaller than the public institutions (“publics”), and so the privates account for 
18. Following the convention of others (e.g., Bowen and Sosa, 1989, 32), we define full-time- 
equivalent enrollment as full-time plus one-third part-time enrollment. 
19. Although a high proportion of the baccalaureate graduates of  Liberal Arts I colleges have 
traditionally continued their education to earn a Ph.D. in economics, this fraction appears to have 
declined in the 1980s (Kasper 1990a). 275  Cost Inflation 
Table 11.3  Sample Institutions  and  Enrollment by Institutional Control 
No. of  % of  No. of  % of 
Control  Institutions  Instititutions  RE  Students'  FTE  Students 
~~ 
Public  1,203  58.8  5,643,032  78.8 
Private  842  41.2  1,s  14,162  21.2 
Total  2,045  100.0  7,157,194  100.0 
Source: Calculations by authors based on HEGIMPEDS data. 
'Full-time-equivalent (FTE) students = full-time students + % part-time students averaged over 
1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86,  and  1987-88. 
only 21 percent of enrollment. Private institutions are somewhat more impor- 
tant in graduate education than undergraduate, they are much less important 
in 'Ikro-Year education than four-year, and they wholly dominate the Liberal 
Arts I  and  Other-Four-Year categories. The private sector includes many 
schools with a strong religious emphasis or with ethnic identifications. About 
100 private institutions have endowments that are large enough to be impor- 
tant in the financial life of the schools.20  The philanthropic tradition in Amer- 
ica sustains many of the private schools with current giving as well as in peri- 
odic capital campaigns.*' 
Private colleges and universities charge tuitions that are many multiples of 
tuitions in the public sector, yet, in the aggregate, they continue to thrive. The 
privates must offer services that students find worth the price difference. As 
we  will see, the privates do not, on average, pay  their faculties more than 
public institutions. They have pursued a variety of  strategies to distinguish 
themselves, including different studentlfaculty ratios, a religious emphasis, 
and distinctive social milieus. That privates are, on average, much smaller 
than their public competitors should not be accepted as coincidental. The 
smaller scale may well be critical in providing a distinctive experience that 
some students value highly. 
Public higher education is primarily a responsibility of  the several states, 
education not having been mentioned in the federal constitution. Each state 
operates one or more systems of higher education, often with grand research 
university campuses as centerpieces flanked by regional comprehensive uni- 
versities (many of  whom had  former lives as teacher-training academies). 
20. For fiscal year 1986, Harvard reported the largest endowment, $3.4 billion; Colorado Col- 
lege was ranked 100 among the 3,400 colleges and universities, with an endowment of  $87.5 
million. The largest 100 endowments accounted for 72 percent of the endowments of all colleges 
and univerisites (US.  Department of  Education 1988, table  148, p. 282). Endowment income 
constitutes less than 3 percent of revenues of all colleges and universities combined. It is relatively 
more important at private institutions, where it accounted for 5 percent of  revenues in  1985-86 
(Anderson, Carter, and Malizio 1989, tables 95, and 97). 
21. Endowment income plus private gifts, grants, and contracts accounted for about 15 percent 
of  the revenues of private colleges and universities in 1985-86  (Anderson, Carter, and Malizio 
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These are complemented by an array of Two-Year colleges that offer terminal 
vocational programs  or  specialized professional training  (e.g.,  dental hy- 
giene, mortuary science) or serve as the lower division (i.e., freshman- and 
sophomore-level programs) of the state university system (e.g., the Pennsyl- 
vania State University has numerous two-year campuses that feed its Univer- 
sity Park campus). 
The national government began support for higher education with the Mor- 
rill Act during the Lincoln administration, awarding grants of land to univer- 
sities in each state for promoting agriculture and industry. The federal govern- 
ment continues to support university-based agricultural research, education, 
and extension programs. Early in this century, the federal government began 
to  support university-based medical research, with  funding awarded on  a 
competitive basis for specific projects. This model was adapted for the support 
of scientific research as the Cold War induced the federal government to spon- 
sor defense-related research in the 1950s. Recently, the agricultural commu- 
nity has called for moving its federal support programs toward the competitive 
project grant regime as a way of improving quality and productivity (National 
Research Council 1989~).  In the 1960s, the federal government added support 
to higher education through grants and loans to students. To  a degree, aid 
flows to students and allows them to shop for what they perceive to be  the 
“best values” in higher education (Hansen and Weisbrod 1971). The national 
government directly supports its five service academies and a few institutions 
in the District of Columbia. There is no national university. 
The financing of private and public colleges and universities differs substan- 
tially. In Chapter 12 we show that, on average, private institutions (without a 
medical school) spent about $3,400 more  per full-time-equivalent student 
than did comparable public universities in  1987-88.  In the same year, how- 
ever, the difference in tuition between them was closer to $5,700 (see Table 
3.4 above). Although students at public institutions do not enjoy the same 
level of expenditures as those at the privates, they receive a price discount that 
more than compensates for the lower level of  spending. The difference, of 
course, is covered by direct appropriations from (mostly) state governments. 
In  essence, all students at public institutions receive a partial  scholarship 
roughly equivalent to the difference between their tuition and expenditures per 
student at their school. 
Students at the same institution also often make different contributions to 
revenues, reflecting differences in scholarship awards. The variation is greater 
at private than at public schools. According to the sample used in this part of 
the volume, the sum of external and institutionally supported scholarship aid 
per  student averaged $533 at publics and $1,769 at privates in 1987-88.  Thus, 
the average net  tuition difference between privates and publics was  about 
$4,500 in  1987-88.  The average tuition level, however, means less at private 
than at public colleges and universities because scholarship aid is distributed 277  Cost Inflation 
much less uniformly across students than is state aid at public universities. At 
private institutions, many students pay  the “sticker price,” while others re- 
ceive scholarships based on need, academic or athletic merit, or other criteria. 
In short, public universities in America are similar to discount stores, offering 
“everyday low prices” to their customers, while private colleges and univer- 
sities are like full-service stores, competing on the basis of service and care- 
fully distributed discount coupons (which they call financial aid). 
Federal grants to support research and development are an important source 
of revenue for Research and Doctoral institutions, and the research activities 
of colleges and universities account for a significant proportion of the total 
research and development produced in the United States. Total federal obli- 
gations to universities and colleges for research and development summed to 
$6.5 billion in  1986.**  The  100 institutions earning the largest amounts re- 
ceived 85  percent ($5.6 billion) of  the total. Johns Hopkins University re- 
ceived the largest amount at $446 million, Yale was tenth with $112 million, 
and Georgetown University was one hundredth with $15 million.23  Research 
funds are consequential to research universities. 
The National Science Foundation reports the total national expenditure on 
research and development in  1986 at  $51.4 billion, of  which colleges and 
universities received or managed $9 billion (about 17 percent) when federally 
funded research-and-development centers are added to  Federal intra- 
mural research facilities and industrial labs account for most of the rest. Note 
that the National Science Foundation survey omits university-based investi- 
gation that is not sponsored by  external funds. In basic research, the role of 
colleges and universities is even more important. Higher education spent or 
managed $4.8 billion of the $8.1 billion the nation spent on basic research in 
1986. The three agencies accounting for the largest amounts of research-and- 
development funds to universities and colleges are as follows: Health and Hu- 
man Services, $3.3 billion (58 percent of the agency’s total R&D effort); De- 
fense, $1.1 billion (3 percent of the agency’s R&D effort); and the National 
Science Foundation, $0.9 billion (73 percent of the agency’s R&D effort). 
The research productivity of the nation depends critically on the activities of 
colleges and universities. 
22. National Science Foundation, Federal Support to Universities,  Colleges, and Selected Non- 
profit Institutions,  Fiscal Year 1986 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 
table B-5,  p. 15. 
23. Many of the research grants are awarded by competition. For example, theNationalScience 
FoundPtion Annual Report, 1988 ([Washington,D.C.: U.S.  Government Printing Office, 19881, 
inside cover) reports that  the  NSF received 37,500 proposals and  awarded more than  16,000 
grants in  1988. A telephone call revealed that the  National Institutes of Health received 20,080 
proposals in fiscal year 1990 and funded 4,845. 
24. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Research and Development, Fiscal Years 
1986, 1987, and 1988 (Washington,  D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,  1988), vol. 36, 
tables C-1, p. 16, and C-7, pp. 28-29. 278  Malcolm Getz and John J. Siegfried 
Table 11.4 
Enrollment  No. of  % of  No. of  % of 
Size Class'  Institutions  Institutions  FTE Studentsb  FTE  Students 
Sample Institutions and  Enrollment by Size Class 
G999  635  31.1  398,083  5.6 
1,000-2,999  750  36.7  1,310,661  18.3 
3,000-9.999  500  24.4  2,721,851  38.0 
10,000-19,OoO  119  5.8  1,635,688  22.9 
20,OoO+  41  2.0  1 ,090,911  15.2 
Total  2,045  100.0  7,157,194  100.0 
Source: Calculations by authors based on HEGISlIPEDS data. 
'Based on average number of full-time-equivalent students in 1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86,  and 
bFull-time-equivalent (FTE) students = full-time students + 'h part-time students averaged over 
1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86,  and 1987-88. 
1987-88. 
Institutions differ widely in size, as reported in Table 11.4. More than two- 
thirds of our colleges have enrollments of under 3,000. Many of these small 
colleges are  in  rural  areas,  conveniently located for commuting students. 
Some of the small schools limit enrollment by design. They are small enough 
for the president to know each faculty member by name, if not each student. 
Some institutions are small because their enrollments have declined as their 
programs have lost favor. We  will be interested in observing whether costs 
differ systematically with size. Can larger institutions offer education at lower 
cost per student than smaller ones? We will turn to the financial data in Chap- 
ter 13 with this question among others. 
Enrollments grew over the 1980s, and they grew in almost every subcate- 
gory, both full- and part-time at both four- and two-year schools and at both 
graduate and undergraduate levels, as shown in Table 1  1.5. This growth oc- 
curred despite unfavorable demographic trends. The size of the birth cohort 
peaked in  1962. Eighteen years later, the number of  18-year-olds reached a 
peak, so the pool of candidates in the prime age bracket for higher education 
started its slide at the beginning of the decade. For a time, the shrinking col- 
lege age cohort did not affect enrollment levels, owing mainly to an increase 
in the enrollment rate of  18- to 24-year-olds and increased enrollment of older 
students, as the baby-boom cohort moved above age 30. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, however, it appears that college enrollments will finally begin to 
decline, and projections are that they may decline until at least 1995 (Bowen 
and Sosa 1989, 37). 
Both the public and the private sectors gained enrollment during the 1980% 
as shown in Table 1  1.6. Graduate education became somewhat more impor- 
tant for the private sector but became a slightly smaller share of  the public 
sector. Part-time students are especially important at public Two-Year col- 279  Cost Inflation 
Table 11.5  Enrollment 'ken& in American Colleges and  Universities, 1978-79 
to 1987-88 
Annual Rate 
1978-79  1983-84  1985-86  1987-88  of  Change 
Four-year institutions (N = 1,192): 
Full-time  4,341,522 
Part-time  1,801,380 
Full-time  3,995,998 
Part-time  1,228,668 
Full-time  345,524 







Two-Year institutions  (N = 853): 
Full-time  1.21 5,934 
Part-time  1,9O7,8W 
Full-time  1,215,836 
Part-time  1,906,933 
Full-time  98 
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2,318,237 
1,251,080 













-  .3 
-4.6 
Source: Calculations  by authors based on HEGWIPEDS data. 
leges, and their importance grew throughout the 1980s. Interestingly, the pri- 
vate "bo-Year  colleges attract part-time students at about the same rate as 
private four-year schools. In this respect, as in quite a number of others, the 
private "bo-Year colleges are more like private four-year colleges than they 
are like public Ttvo-Year colleges. 
Table  11.7 reports enrollment data by Camegie classification. Research in- 
stitutions and Liberal Arts I colleges grew somewhat more slowly than Doc- 
toral and Comprehensive institutions, perhaps by  design and perhaps in re- 
sponse  to  the  accelerating tuition  levels of  Research  and  Liberal  Arts I 
institutions in the 1980s. Many institutions consciously limit enrollments so 
as to retain the human attributes of a particular scale of operation. By restrict- 
ing enrollment, institutions can limit admission to particular students. The 
selective schools can then offer the promise of a certain exclusivity to future 
students. If the attitudes, skills, and motivation of peers is an important ingre- 280  Malcolm Getz and John J. Siegfried 
Table 11.6  Full-Time-Equivalent Enrollment Rends in American Colleges and 
Universities, 1978-1979 to 1987-88,  by Control 
Control 
Annual Rate 
1978-79  1983-84  1985-86  1987-88  of  Change 
Four-year institutions (N = 1192): 
Public (N = 453): 
FTE enrollment  3,541,469 
Average FTE en-  7,818 
% part-time  29.5 
% graduate  14.5 
FTE enrollment  1,400,513 
Average FTE en-  1,895 
% part-time  29.0 
% graduate  16.2 
rollment 
Private (N = 739): 
rollment 
Two-Year institutions (N = 853): 
Public (N = 750): 
FTE enrollment  1,800,058 
Average FTE en-  2,400 
% part-time  61.8 
rollment 
% graduate  .o 
Private (N = 103): 
FTE enrollment  51,812 
Average FTE en-  503 
% part-time  22.3 
rollment 
% graduate  .o 
3,768,440  3,740,166  3,846,166  .9 
8,319  8,256  8,491 
29.2  29.9  30.6 
13.2  13.5  13.7 
1,469,903  1.465.19 1  1,493,497  .7 
1,989  1,983  2,021 
30.8  30.5  30.5 
16.1  16.7  17.2 
2,020,908  1,887,864  1,966,827  .9 
2,695  2,517  2,622 
62.8  64.4  65.6 
.o  .o  .o 
61,008  57,644  57,082  1.1 
592  560  554 
30.8  32.0  32.0 
.o  .o  .o 
Source: Calculations by authors based on HEGWIPEDS data. 
aFull-time-equivalent (FTE) students  = full-time students + % part-time students. 
dient in the educational process, or if  the screening accomplished by the ad- 
missions process is relied on by  employers and  graduate and professional 
schools, then the fact of selection may increase the attractiveness of the school 
to subsequent students. We  have kept the number of schools and their classi- 
fication by mission unchanged over the interval of study (they are all classified 
on the basis of their 1987 Carnegie classification) so that the reported enroll- 
ment and financial figures are not affected by possible changes in mission or 
entrances and exits of  institutions. Although some institutions may be  mis- 
classified (Breneman 1990), each category represents a consistent set of insti- 
tutions. 
Institutions of all size groups experienced growth, but, on average, smaller 
institutions grew slightly faster than larger institutions, as Table 11.8 reveals. 
Among Two-Year colleges, the schools with fewer than 3,000  students grew 281  Cost Inflation 
Table 11.7  Enroltment -ends  in American Colleges and Universities by 'Qpe  of 
Institution, 1978-79 to 1987-88 
Annual Rate 
1978-79  1983-84  1985-86  1987-88  of Change 
Research institutions (N  = 90): 
FTE enrollment  1,595,578 
Average FTE  enrollment  17,729 
8  part-time  22.6 
% graduate  20.5 
FTE enrollment  854,653 
Average FTE enrollment  8,903 
% part-time  32.0 
8  graduate  17.9 
FTE enrollment  2,049,591 
Average RE  enrollment  3,926 
% part-time  35.2 
Doctoral institutions (N = 96): 
Comprehensive  institutions (N  = 522): 
% graduate  12.1 
Liberal Arts I institutions (N = 131): 
FTE  enrollment  1  82,627 
Average FTE  enrollment  1,394 
8  part-time  12.8 
Other-Four-Year  institutions (N  = 353): 
FTE  enrollment  259,533 
% graduate  3.4 
Average FTE enrollment  735 
% part-time  20.1 
% graduate  26.3 
FTE  enrollment  1,851,870 
Average FIT enrollment  2,171 
% part-time  61.1 
Two-Year institutions (N  = 853): 
















































































Source: Calculations by authors based on HEGWIPEDS data. 
Note: FTE = full-time-equivalent. 
twice as fast as the schools with 3,000 or more students. Among four-year 
institutions, growth  appears to  be  concentrated in  medium-sized schools. 
Those with enrollments under 1  ,000  and over 20,000  grew at about half the 
rate of schools with enrollments between 1,000 and 20,000. These patterns 
reflect the enrollment targets set by  selective schools and the investments in 
campuses made by state systems, but probably are dominated by the selection 
of schools by prospective students. 
Full-time-equivalent enrollments have grown at slightly less than 1 percent 
annually from 1978-79  to 1987-88.  But growth has not been uniform at all 282  Malcolm Getz and John J. Siegfried 
Table 11.8  Full-llme-Equivalent Enrollment 'ken&  in American Colleges and 
Universities,  1978-1987,  by Size Class 
Average  Sample  Average Annual 
Enrollment  Size  1978-79  1983-84  1985-86  1987-88  Rate of Change 
Four-year institutions: 
0-999  333  208,000  212,724  209,544  221,009  .5 
1 ,000-2,999  412  687,599  727,980  727,954  755,131  1 .O 
3,000-9,999  303  1,613,668  1,739,820  1,715,915  1,745,711  .9 
10,000-19,999  103  1,377,774  1,460,463  1,453,308  1,505,327  .9 
20,000 +  41  1,054,941  1,097,356  1,098,636  1,112,713  .6 
Total  1,192  4,941,982  5,238,343  5,205,357  5,339,891 
Two-Year institutions: 
0-999  302  171,706  190,713  184,279  194,357  1.3 
1,000-2.999  338  536,253  623,402  577,976  606,349  1.2 
3,000-9.999  197  976,157  1,070,396  1,000,191  1,034,546  .5 
10,000-19,999  16  176,754  197,405  183,062  188,658  .6 
Total  853  1,860,870  2,081,916  1,945,508  2,023,910 
Source: Calculations by authors based on HEGIS/IPEDS data. 
institutions. One-third of our sample institutions experienced growth rates ex- 
ceeding 1.8 percent annually over the period, while enrollments at about an- 
other third (36.5 percent) actually declined. The different enrollment experi- 
ences of  various categories of  institutions are reported in  Tables  11.9 and 
11.10. 
Because the public sector has grown slightly faster than the private sector 
over the decade, it is no surprise to find that public Comprehensive and public 
Two-Year colleges contain the highest proportion of institutions whose enroll- 
ments grew in excess of 1.8 percent annually. Of the institutions with declin- 
ing enrollments, a disproportionate share are private Other-Four-Year (less 
selective liberal arts and  smaller comprehensives) and  Two-Year colleges. 
Both these categories appear to contain institutions in the midst of transition. 
Over 78 percent of the institutions in each category are experiencing either 
rapidly rising or declining enrollments. Both categories contain mostly insti- 
tutions that enroll under 1  ,OOO  students (267 of 330 private Other-Four-Year 
and 93 of  103 private Two-Year), and the two categories together account for 
57 percent of  the 635 institutions in our sample with fewer than  1,000  stu- 
dents. This, and further evidence we uncover later, suggests that such small 
institutions are not in stable equilibrium. Most of these institutions will either 
grow to enrollment levels beyond 1,000 or eventually close their doors. 
With this description of the environment of American higher education in 
the 1980s, we turn in subsequent chapters to an analysis of  the patterns and 
trends in costs. In Chapter 12, we look at how cost structures and changes in 
costs over time are related to institutional mission and control. In Chapter 13, Table 11.9  Distribution of Institutions with Fastest-Growing Enrollmentr (percentage  among top third enrollment growth, 
1978-79  to 1987-88) 
~ 
Public  Rivate  Total 
Camegie Classification  Sample Size  No.  Growing  % Growing  Sample Sue  No.  Growing  % Growing  Sample Size  No.  Growing  t  Growing 
Research  66  8  12.1  24  3  12.5  90  I1  12.2 
Doctoral  60  14  23.3  36  8  22.2  96  22  22.9 
Comprehensive  301  114  37.9  219  72  32.9  520  186  35.8 
Liberal Arts I  2  1  50.0  129  16  12.4  131  17  13.0 
Other-Four-Year  22  9  40.9  331  105  31.7  353  114  32.3 
Two-Year  750  296  39.5  I03  36  35.0  853  332  38.9 
Total  1,203  442  36.7  842  240  28.2  2,045  682  33.3 
Source: Computations by authors based on HEGWIPEDS data for 1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86,  and 1987-88. 
'The  lowest annual rate of enrollment growth 1978-79  to 1987-88  among the fastest-growing one-third of  institutions  is 1.8 percent. Table 11.10  Distribution of Institutions with Fastest-Declining  Enrollments' (percentage  among lowest third enrollment growth, 
1978-79  to 1987-88) 
~~ 
Public  Private  Total 
Camegie Classification Sample Size  No. Declining  % Declining  Sample Size  No. Declining  % Declining  Sample Size  No. Declining  ?6 Declining 
Research  66  17  25.8  24  0  0.0  90  17  18.9 
Doctoral  60  11  18.3  36  13  36.1  96  24  25.0 
Comprehensive  30 1  79  26.1  219  71  32.4  520  150  28.8 
Liberal Arts I  2  1  50.0  129  38  29.5  131  39  29.8 
Other-Four-Year  22  6  27.3  33 1  154  46.5  353  160  45.3 
Two-Year  750  243  32.4  103  49  47.6  853  292  34.2 
Total  1,203  357  29.7  842  325  38.6  2,045  682  33.3 
Source: Computations  by authors based on HEGIS/IPEDS data for 1978-79,  1983-84,  1985-86, and 1987-88. 
'The highest annual rate of enrollment growth 1978-79  to 1987-88  among the slowest-growing third of  institutions is -0.1  percent. Of the 2,045 institutions in the 
sample, 747 experienced declining enrollments. 285  Cost Inflation 
we  look more closely at the effect of  growth and decline on per-student ex- 
penditures and examine how per-student costs vary with the size of  an insti- 
tution. Finally, in  Chapter 14, we investigate the link between the student/ 
faculty ratio and the cost per student in an effort to learn precisely what is 
driving up college costs. Our goal throughout is to  see what we can learn 
about recent developments in the costs of  higher education that might shed 
light on the different theories of why tuition has increased so rapidly. 